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Abstract
We study the compatibility of the optimal population size con-
cepts produced by different social welfare functions and egalitarism
meant as “equal consumption for all individuals of all generations”.
Social welfare functions are parameterized by an altruism parameter
generating the Benthamite and Millian criteria as polar cases. The
economy considered is in continuous time and is populated by ho-
mogenous cohorts with a given life span. Production functions are
linear in labor, (costly) procreation is the unique way to transfer re-
sources forward in time. First, we show that egalitarism is optimal
whatever the degree of altruism when life spans are infinite. That is
egalitarism does not discriminate between the social welfare functions
considered. However, when life spans are finite, egalitarism does not
arise systematically as an optimal outcome. In particular, it depends
on the degree of altruism, and also on the magnitude of the life span.
In particular, to be enforced in a growing economy, that is when popu-
lation growth is optimal in the long-run, this egalitarian rule can only
hold when (i) the welfare function is Benthamite, (ii) and for a large
enough life span. When altruism is impure, egalitarism is impossible
in the context of a growing economy. Either in the Millian case, what-
ever the life span, or in the Benthamite/impure altruism cases, for
small enough life spans, procreation is never optimal, leading to finite
time extinction and maximal consumption for all existing individuals.
Key words: Egalitarism, Population change, Optimal population
size, Benthamite Vs Millian criterion, Finite lives, Growth
JEL numbers: D63, D64, C61, 0 40
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1 Introduction
Egalitarian concerns are at the heart of several research areas in economics,
like the theory of justice (what should be an egalitarian allocation? Equality
of what? See for example Rawls, 1971, and Sen, 1980, among many oth-
ers), public economics (how to measure inequality? what policies to reduce
inequalities? See Atkinson, 1970, for a theoretical view), and poverty and
development (measurement of poverty and pro-poor policies, see for example
Datt and Ravallion, 1992). Among the specific questions treated, the role of
population size in the genesis of inequality has become central, founding the
area of population ethics. Dasgupta (2005) is an excellent survey of research
in this area.
A considerable part of the related contributions has been devoted to study
the extent to which the classical forms of utilitarianism can make the job of
ranking populations of different sizes according to the kind of equality meant.
Throughout our paper, we study equality in terms of welfare as measured by
utility from consumption. This is certainly a benchmark (see the basic model
in this area in Dasgupta, 2005) but consumption can be taken, as always, in
a very broad sense. A central contribution in the area of population ethics
is Parfit (1984). According to Parfit, total utilitarianism (that’s the Ben-
thamite social welfare functions) may lead to prefer a situation with a very
large population size while the standards of living are quite low compared
to a situation with a smaller population and better standards of living (as
mesured by consumption per capita for example). Parfit calls this outcome
a repugnant conclusion.1 Actually, Edgeworth (1925) was the first to claim
that total utilitarianism leads to a bigger population size and lower standard
of living. So this discussion has also always been important in normative
economic theory as well. An interesting connected theoretical question is the
notion of optimal population size, which is admittedly another old question
in economic theory (see for example Dasgupta, 1969). Typically, in all the
papers that have been written to study the robustness of Edgeworth claim
(see a short survey below), population size is chosen so as to maximize the
considered social welfare functions. In fine, the key question is: is the opti-
mal population size concept produced by this or that social welfare function
compatible with standard and less standard egalitarian principles? This is
indeed the question we treat in this paper in a novel framework, which will
be described later.
Both the population ethics and the normative economic theory sides of
the problem stated above have experienced important developments. This
1Dasgupta (2005) discusses to which extent the term “repugnant” is appropriate.
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is specially true for the former. Major contributors here are Temkin (1993)
and more recently, Arrhenius (2011, 2009). Starting with the seminal work
of Parfit, these authors have tried to axiomatize new egalitarian concepts al-
lowing to surmount the deficiencies of the Bentamite paradigm, among other
standard normative approaches. A general approach to ranking different
populations in terms of equality is to count the number of pairwise relations
of inequality vs equality. According to Arrhenius (2011), a plausible prin-
ciple is positive egalitarianism: the egalitarian value of a given population
is a strictly increasing function of pairwise equality relations and a strictly
decreasing function of pairwise relations of inequality. This concept of egali-
tarianism seems promising in many respects but still it leads to a number of
striking implications.2
All in all, population ethics is currently a very active research area with
many open questions and debates. Two literature streams have emerged
recently. One, a sort of natural continuation of the Beckerian endogenous
fertility model (see for example, Barro and Becker, 1989), is concerned by
the construction of Pareto efficiency principles in overlapping-generations
models involving quite naturally external effects within dynasties running
from parents to children and vice versa. A subtle representative of this
type of literature is Golosov et al. (2007) which presents several efficiency
concepts depending on the way unborn are treated.3 The second stream takes
a more axiomatic approach and is much more connected to the literature
initiated by Parfit (1985). In particular, this approach is not built on the
overlapping-generations model and the externalities inherent to its dynastic
structure. Representatives of this approach are Blackorby et al. (2005), and
more recently Asheim and Zuber (2012).
In this paper, we also depart from the dynastic approach outlined above
and, just like Asheim and Zuber (2012), we come back to the question raised
by Parfit concerning notably the virtues and shortcomings of total utilitarian-
ism Vs average utilitarianism. More specifically, we examine this old question
within the modern framework of endogenous growth, having in mind that
growth, by relaxing resource constraints, might ease avoiding the paradoxi-
cal outcomes outlined by Parfit, and even might pave the way to reach more
egalitarian allocations across individuals and across generations. Actually,
the robustness of Edgeworth’s claim when societies experience long periods
(say infinite time periods) of economic growth has been already discussed in
two previous papers, namely Razin and Yuen (1995) and Palivos and Yip
(1993). We shall rely on the same class of parameterized social welfare func-
2See Arrhenius (2011) for details.
3Another excellent reference is Conde Ruiz et al. (2010).
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tions used by these authors.4 The parametrization consists in weighting the
utility of individuals at any given date t by the term Nγ(t) where N(t) is
the size of the population at t and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 measures a kind of degree
of altruism towards individuals to be born in future dates. Concretely, the
latter term decreases the time discount rate, inducing a larger weight for
individuals of future generations in the social welfare functions. The larger
parameter γ, the larger this weight. To fix the terminology, we shall refer
to γ as the degree of altruism.5 When γ = 1 (Resp. γ = 0) one gets the
standard Benthamite (Resp. Millian) social welfare function. We may treat
γ as a continuous parameter and interpret the cases where 0 < γ < 1 as cases
where altruism is impure or imperfect.
Using the same class of social welfare function, Palivos and Yip (1993)
showed that Edgeworth’s claim cannot hold for the realistic parameteriza-
tions of their model. Precisely, they established their results in the framework
of endogenous growth driven by an AK production function. The determi-
nation of the optimum relies on the following trade-off: on one hand, the
utility function depends explicitly on population growth rate; on the other,
population growth has the standard linear dilution effect on physical capital
accumulation. Palivos and Yip proved that in such a framework the Ben-
thamite criterion leads to a smaller population size and a higher growth rate
of the economy provided the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower
than one (consistently with empirical evidence), that is when the utility func-
tion is negative. Indeed, a similar result could be generated in the setting
of Razin and Yuen (1995) when allowing for negative utility functions.6 It
goes without saying that the value of not-living is essential in the outcomes:7
in the class of models surveyed just above, this value is typically zero, so
that negative utility functions imply that living gives inferior value than not
living.
Our paper goes much beyond the technical point mentioned just above.
Essentially it aims at investigating the compatibility between total utilitar-
ianism (Resp. average utilitarianism) and egalitarism in an economy where
human resources, and therefore population size, is the engine of growth.
Specifically, our set-up has the following three distinctive features:
4To be accurate, Nerlove et al. (1982) are the first to use this class of social welfare
functions. A more recent paper using this class is Strulik (2005).
5We could have referred to it regarding its role in intertemporal discounting to show
better the distance with respect to dynastic models. We choose the altruism terminology
for convenience.
6See also Boucekkine and Fabbri (2011).
7Dasgupta (2005) has already underlined the crucial nature of this point.
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1. First, we shall consider a minimal model in the sense that we do not
consider neither capital accumulation (as in Palivos and Yip) nor natu-
ral resources (as in Makdissi, 2001): we consider one productive input,
population (that’s labor), and the production function is AN with N
the population size. By taking this avenue, population growth and
economic growth will coincide in contrast to the previous related AK
literature (and in particular to Razin and Yuen, 1995). More impor-
tantly our model is clearly at odds with the typical genesis problem as
presented by Dasgupta (2005) in his survey: not only we have constant
returns to scale (vs. decreasing returns in Dasgupta), but apparently
we don’t have any type of investment to transfer resources to the fu-
ture. As one will see, our model does actually entail a form of forward
resource transfer simply through having children: having children is
costly (investment) but they are the workers of tomorrow, and therefore
they are the exclusive wealth producers in the future (forward income
transfer). Because birth costs are supposed linear in our AN model,
one would expect to have the same outcomes as in a standard AK
model. In particular, detrended consumption would be constant. Since
demographic and economic growth coincide in our model, one would
infer that constant per capita consumption is a possible outcome. In-
deed it is the latter important observation that led us to select this
minimal model for the study of the compatibility between total (Resp.
average) utilitarianism and egalitarism. Indeed, one can choose “equal
consumption per capital for all individuals and all generations” as the
natural egalitarian principle in our framework.
2. Second, we bring into the analysis the life span of individuals. We shall
assume that all individuals of all cohorts live a fixed amount of time, say
T . The value of T will be shown to be crucial for the outcomes of the
analysis. As outlined above, procreating is the unique way to transfer
resources forward in time. Durability of these resources, captured by
the life span T , is therefore likely to be key for the design of the optimal
procreation plan. We shall assume that life span is exogenous in our
model. Admittedly, a large part of the life spans of all species is the
result of a complex evolutionary process (see the provocative paper of
Galor and Moav, 2007). Also it has been clearly established that for
many species life span correlates with mass, genome size, and growth
rate, and that these correlations occur at differing taxonomic levels (see
for example Goldwasser, 2001). Of course, part of the contemporaneous
increase of humans’ life span is, in contrast, driven by health spending
and medical progress. We shall abstract from the latter aspect; as
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explained below, our setting with exogenous life spans is already heavily
sophisticated technically speaking.
3. Third, in comparison with the AK models surveyed above which do not
display transitional dynamics, our AN model does display transitional
dynamics because of the finite lifetime assumption (just like in the AK
vintage capital model studied in Boucekkine et al., 2005, and Fabbri
and Gozzi, 2008). The deep reason of these different behaviors is that
the finite life span setting we use allows to take into account the whole
age-distribution structure of the population that does have a key role
in the evolution of the system. Indeed the engine of the transitional
dynamics of detrended variables is the rearrangement of the shares
among the cohorts. This clearly distinguishes the approach we use
from the models with “radioactive” decay of the population (and from
our benchmark T = +∞ case) where all the individual are identical.
As a consequence, the property that at the optimum one gets “equal
consumption per capita for all individuals and all generations” is quite
challenging. This makes our problem either technical and theoretically
fundamentally nontrivial.
Resorting to AN production functions has also the invaluable advan-
tage to allow for (nontrivial) analytical solutions to the optimal dynamics
in certain parametric conditions. In particular, we shall provide optimal dy-
namics in closed-form in the two polar cases where the welfare function is
Millian Vs Benthamite, and to a class of intermediate parameterizations of
the social welfare function. It is important to notice here that considering
finite lifetimes changes substantially the mathematical nature of the opti-
mization problem under study. Because the induced state equations are no
longer ordinary differential equations but delay differential equations, the
problem is infinitely dimensioned. Problems with these characteristics are
tackled in Boucekkine et al. (2005), Fabbri and Gozzi (2008) and recently
by Boucekkine, Fabbri and Gozzi (2010). We shall follow the dynamic pro-
gramming approach used in the two latter papers. Because some of the
optimization problems studied in this paper present additional peculiarities,
a nontrivial methodological progress has been made along the way. The main
technical details on the dynamic programming approach followed are however
reported in the appendix given the complexity of the material.
Main findings
Several findings will be highlighted along the way. At the minute, we
enhance two of them.
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1. A major contribution of the paper is the striking implication of finite
life spans for the optimal consumption pattern across cohorts. Indeed,
we study under which conditions the successive cohorts will be given
the same consumption per capita. We show that our egalitarian rule
“equal consumption per capital for all individuals and all generations”
is optimal whatever the degree of altruism when life spans are infinite,
so it does not discriminate between the social welfare functions con-
sidered (including the polar Benthamite and Millian cases). However,
when life spans are finite, egalitarism does not arise systematically as
an optimal outcome. In particular, it depends on the degree of altruism
(see below), and also on the magnitude of the life span. In particular,
to be enforced in a growing economy, this egalitarian rule requires life
span to be large enough. When altruism is impure, egalitarism is im-
possible in the context of a growing economy.
2. Second, the analysis illustrates the crucial role of the degree of altruism
in the shape of the optimal allocation rules for given finite life span,
and the framework allows for striking clear-cut analytical results. Effec-
tively we highlight dramatic differences between the Millian and Ben-
thamite cases in terms of optimal dynamics, which is to our knowledge
a first contribution to this topic (the vast majority of the papers in the
topic only are working on balanced growth paths). The Millian welfare
function leads to optimal population extinction at finite time whatever
individuals’ lifetime. More precisely, in such a case, it is never optimal
to procreate, which leads to extinction at finite time as life spans are
finite. At the same time, the egalitarian rule “equal consumption per
capital for all individuals and all generations” is stricto sensu fulfilled
since all (preexisiting) individuals will be given the same (maximal)
consumption. Thus, we identify a kind of “repugnant conclusion” in-
herent to the Millian social welfare function (or average utilitarianism),
consistently with Parfit’s own considerations on this type of utilitarian-
ism (see also Hammond, 1988, for a more detailed discussion), that’s it
can lead to prefer having only very few people with very high standards
of living (which suggests that execution might be ethically acceptable
according to this criterion). The specific contribution of our paper is to
show that this property arises whatever the value of the life span lead-
ing to population extinction at finite time!8 The Benthamite case does
deliver a much more complex picture. We identify the existence of two
threshold values for individuals’ lifetime, say T0 < T1: below T0, finite
8For a more positive theory of extinction, see de la Croix and Dottori (2008).
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time extinction is optimal; above T1, balanced growth paths (at posi-
tive rates) are optimal. In between, asymptotic extinction is optimal.
That’s to say, if life span is large enough, Parfit’s repugnant conclu-
sion for total utilitarianism does not hold: even more, all individuals
of all generations will receive the same consumption, and therefore will
enjoy the same welfare. On the other hand, our analysis implies that
the Benthamite criterion is not necessarily pro-natalist: in particular,
if life spans are small enough, this criterion would legitimate finite time
extinction just like to anti-natalist Millian criterion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the optimal popu-
lation model, gives some technical details on the maximal admissible growth
and the boundedness of the associated value function, and displays some pre-
liminary results on extinction. Section 3 studies the infinite lifetime case as
a benchmark. Section 4 derives the optimal dynamics corresponding to the
Millian Vs Benthamite cases. Section 5 studies the case of impure (or imper-
fect) altruism. Section 6 concludes. The Appendices A and B are devoted
to collect most of the proofs.
2 The problem
2.1 The model
Let us consider a population in which every cohort has a fixed finite life
span equal to T . Assume for simplicity that all the individuals remain per-
fectly active (i.e. they have the same productivity and the same procreation
ability) along their life time. Moreover assume that, at every moment t, if
N(t) denotes the size of population at t, the size n(t) of the cohort born
at time t is bounded by M · N(t), where M > 0 measures the maximal
(time-independent) biological reproduction capacity of an individual.
The dynamic of the population size N(t) is then driven by the following
delay differential equation (in integral form):
N(t) =
∫ t
t−T
n(s) ds, t ≥ 0, (1)
and
n(t) ∈ [0,MN(t)], t ≥ 0. (2)
The past history of n(r) = n0(r) ≥ 0 for r ∈ [−T, 0) is known at time 0:
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it is in fact the initial datum of the problem9. This features the main math-
ematical implication of assuming finite lives. Pointwise initial conditions,
say n(0) or N(0) , are no longer sufficient to determine a path for the state
variable, N(t). Instead, an initial function is needed. The problem becomes
infinitely dimensioned, and the standard techniques do not immediately ap-
ply. Summarizing, (1) becomes:
N(t) =
∫ t
t−T
n(s) ds, n(r) = n0(r) ≥ 0 for r ∈ [−T, 0), N(0) =
∫ 0
−T
n(r) dr.
(3)
Note that the constraint (2) together with the positivity of n0 ensure the
positivity of N(t) for all t ≥ 0. Note also that, if N(t¯) = 0 for a certain t¯ ≥ 0
then we must have N(t) = 0 for every t ≥ t¯, as we expect.
We consider a closed economy, with a unique consumption good, char-
acterized by a labor-intensive aggregate production function exhibiting con-
stant returns to scale, that is
Y (t) = aN(t). (4)
Note that by equation (1) we are assuming that individuals born at any
date t start working immediately after birth. Delaying participation into the
labor market is not an issue but adding another time delay into the model
will complicate unnecessarily the (already extremely tricky) computations.
Note also that there is no capital accumulation in our model. The linearity
of the production technology is necessary to generate long-term growth, it is
also adopted in the related bulk of papers surveyed in the introduction. If
decreasing returns were introduced, that is Y (t) = aNα with α < 1, growth
will vanish, and we cannot in such a case connect life span with economic
and demographic growth.
Output is partly consumed, and partly devoted to raising the newly born
cohort, say rearing costs. In this benchmark we assume that the latter costs
are linear in the size of the cohort, which leads to the following resource
constraint:
Y (t) = N(t)c(t) + bn(t) (5)
where b > 0. Again we could have assumed that rearing costs are distributed
over time but consistently with our assumption of immediate participation in
the labor market, we assume that these costs are paid once for all at time of
birth. On the other hand, the linearity of the costs is needed for the optimal
9To ensure treatability of the problem we assume that n0(·) ∈ L2(−T, 0;R+), the space
of square integrable functions from [−T, 0) to R+.
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control problem considered above to admit closed-form solutions. As it will
be clear along the way, this assumption is much more innocuous than the
AN production function considered.
Let us describe now accurately the optimal control problem handled. The
controls of the problem are n(·) and c(·) but, using (4) and (5), one obtains
aN(t) = c(t)N(t) + bn(t). (6)
so we have only to choose c(t) (or, equivalently, n(t)) for all t ≥ 0 and the
other will be given by (6). We choose to work with the control n(·) to ease
proving and writing down the results. Then c(·) will be given by
c(t) =
aN(t)− bn(t)
N(t)
. (7)
From such equation it is clear that c(t) is well defined only when N(t) > 0, it
does not make sense after extinction arise. We come back to this issue later.
Concerning the constraints, since we want both per-capita consumption and
the size of new cohorts to remain positive, using (6) we require, in term of
n(·):
0 ≤ n(t) ≤ a
b
N(t), ∀t ≥ 0 (8)
or, in terms of c(·),
0 ≤ c(t) ≤ a, N(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0. (9)
So we consider the controls n(·) in the set10
Un0 :=
{
n(·) ∈ L1loc(0,+∞;R+) : eq. (8) holds for all t ≥ 0
}
. (10)
We shall consider the following social welfare functional to be maximized
within the latter set of controls:
J(n0(·);n(·)) :=
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtu(c(t))Nγ(t) dt,
or equivalently
J(n0(·);n(·)) :=
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtu
(
aN(t)− bn(t)
N(t)
)
Nγ(t) dt, (11)
10The space L1loc(0,+∞;R+) in the definition of Un0 is defined as L1loc(0,+∞;R+) :={
f : [0,+∞)→ R+ : f measurable and
∫ T
0
|f(x)|dx < +∞, ∀T > 0
}
.
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where ρ > 0 is the time discount factor, u : (0,+∞) → (0,+∞) is a con-
tinuous, strictly increasing and concave function, and γ ∈ [0, 1]. We denote
the social welfare functional by J(n0(·);n(·)) to underline its dependency,
beyond the control strategy n(·), also on the initial datum n0(·). γ is in-
terepreted as the degree of altruism of the social planner towards individuals
of future generations. As explained in the introduction, this interpretation is
consistent with the fact that the term Nγ(t) is a determinant of the discount
rate at which the welfare of future generations is discounted. At this early
stage, it is important to observe that the social welfare function considered
does not account for the age-structure of population (in contrast to the state
equation): we implicitly assume that the benevolent planner gives the same
consumption c(t) for all individuals living at date t whatever their age. So a
kind of instantaneous egalitarism is already included in the specification of
the problem. We will see that it does not guarantee “equal consumption per
capita for all individuals and all generations”.11 Last but not least, notice
also that we only consider positive utility functions. Indeed, our modeling
implicitly implies that the value of not living is zero. As explained in the
introduction, a (strictly) negative utility function therefore implies that not
living is superior to living, implying that the the optimal cohort is zero. As a
result, for any initial conditions and any lifetime, T , the planner will choose
extinction at finite time. This argument is formalized in the discussion paper
version of the paper.12
Maximization of the social welfare function specified above in the control
set given by (10) is not only mathematically nontrivial given the infinite di-
mension of the problem and its possible non-convexity. More importantly, it
is economically nontrivial at least when γ > 0, that’s when the social welfare
function is not Millian. The involved trade-off is rather simple. Procreation
is costly but it is beneficial for society for two reasons in our setting: it allows
to secure more production now and in the future, and the social planner is
intertemporally altruistic in the sense given in the introduction and below
the definition of the social welfare in this section. The second effect vanishes
if γ = 0. The trade-off is clearly nontrivial when γ > 0. It is even less trivial
when has to add the finite life span characteristic. And it’s definitely tricky
if one has to guess whether the optimal solution of these trade-offs leads to
egalitarian allocations over time. Only in very few cases an analogy can be
11A more general formulation would incorporate the age structure of the population not
only in the social welfare function but also in the production function through a given age
profile of productivity for example. We abstract away from this potential extension here.
12see Proposition 2.3 of an earlier version at: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.
fr/docs/00/53/60/73/PDF/DTGREQAM2010_40.pdf. Also, utility functions with no
sign restriction are explicitly handled in this paper, see Section 3.2.2.
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established between our framework and the standard AK models.13
Before solving these tricky trade-offs, we end our description of the prob-
lem by a very important tecnical point. Indeed, it is important to observe
that our social welfare functional is not well defined if, at a certain finite
time t¯, we have N(t¯) = 0, i.e. when extinction in finite time arises. Since we
want to treat also cases with finite time extinction, then we have to define
our welfare functional in such cases.
Definition 2.1 An admissible control strategy n¯(·) ∈ Un0 is said to drive
the system to finite time extinction if the corresponding state N reaches the
value 0 in a finite time t¯ ≥ 0. In this case the value of the social welfare
functional is set equal to
J(n0(·);n(·)) =
∫ t¯
0
e−ρtu
(
aN(t)− bn(t)
N(t)
)
Nγ(t) dt+
∫ +∞
t¯
e−ρtu(a)Nγ(t) dt,
i.e. as if the consumption would remain maximum till +∞.
The reason for such definition is that it ensures the continuity of the social
welfare functional14. Indeed it can be easily shown that every strategy n(·)
driving the system to extinction at time t¯ is indeed, on [0, t¯], the limit, for
k → +∞, of strategies nk(·) keeping the associated state Nk(t) > 0 at all
t ≥ 015. With the above definition we ensure that
J(n0(·);nk(·)) −→ J(n0(·);n(·)), as k → +∞
Once the social welfare functional is well defined we can go ahead defining
the value function of our problem as
V (n0(·)) := sup
n(·)∈Un0
J(n0(·);n(·))
We now give the definition of optimal control strategy adapted to our case.
13If we interpret n as investment and N as the capital stock, then one can find analogies
with standard AK models only under some very special parameterizations, as we will
explain along the way.
14Other definitions are possible e.g. stating that
J(n0(·);n(·)) :=
∫ t¯
0
e−ρtu
(
aN(t)− bn(t)
N(t)
)
Nγ(t) dt
but this way we would loose the continuity of the welfare functional which would be not
desirable in this context.
15Indeed it is enough to take, ck(t) = c(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ (t¯−T )∨0 and ck(t) =
(
a− 1k
)∨0
for t > (t¯− T ) ∨ 0 and choose nk(·) consequently.
13
Definition 2.2 An admissible control strategy c¯(·) ∈ U is optimal for the
initial datum n0(·) if J(n0(·); c¯(·)) is finite and J(n0(·); c(·)) = V (n0(·)).
Note that, since the utility is positive, the value function is positive, too.
Moreover, to avoid unnecessary technical complications we restrict ourselves
to study cases where the value function is finite.
2.2 Maximal admissible growth
We begin our analysis by giving a sufficient condition ensuring the bound-
edness of the value function of the problem. The arguments used are quite
intuitive so we mostly sketch the proofs.16.
Consider the state equation (3) with the constraint (9). Given an initial
datum n0(·) ≥ 0 (and then N(0) =
∫ 0
−T n0(r) dr), we consider the admissible
control defined as cMAX ≡ 0. This control obviously gives the maximal
population size allowed, associated with nMAX(t) =
a
b
N(t) by equation (6):
it is the control/trajectory in which all the resources are assigned to raising
the newly born cohorts with nothing left to consumption. Call the trajectory
related to such a control NMAX(·). By definition NMAX(·) is a solution to
the following delay differential equation (written in integral form):
NMAX(t) =
∫ 0
(t−T )∧0
n0(s) ds+
a
b
∫ t
(t−T )∨0
NMAX(s) ds. (12)
The characteristic equation of such a delay differential equation is17
z =
a
b
(
1− e−zT ) . (13)
It can be readily shown (see e.g. Fabbri and Gozzi, 2008, Proposition 2.1.8)
that if a
b
T > 1, the characteristic equation has a unique strictly positive root
ξ. This root belongs to (0, a
b
) and it is also the root with maximal real part.
If a
b
T ≤ 1, then all the roots of the characteristic equation have non-positive
real part and the root with maximal real part is 0. In that case, we define
ξ = 0. We have that (see for example Diekmann et al., 1995, page 34), for
all  > 0,
lim
t→∞
NMAX(t)
e(ξ+)t
= 0, (14)
16The reader interested in technical details in the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Proposition
2.1 is reported to Propositions 2.1.6, 2.1.10 and 2.1.11 in Fabbri and Gozzi (2008).
17As for any linear dynamic equation (in integral or differential form), the characteristic
equation is obtained by looking at exponential solutions, say ezt, of the equation.
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and that the dynamics of NMAX(t) are asymptotically driven by the expo-
nential term corresponding to the root of the characteristic equation with
the largest real part. As it will be shown later, this result drives the opti-
mal economy to extinction when individuals’ lifetime is low enough. At the
minute, notice that since NMAX(·) is the trajectory obtained when all the
resources are diverted from consumption, it is the trajectory with the largest
population size. More formally, one can write:
Lemma 2.1 Consider a control cˆ(·) ∈ U and the related trajectory Nˆ(·)
given by (1). We have that
Nˆ(t) ≤ NMAX(t), for all t ≥ 0.
The previous lemma, coupled with property (14), straightforwardly im-
plies the following sufficient condition for the value function of the problem
to be bounded:
Proposition 2.1 The following hypothesis
ρ > γξ (15)
is sufficient to ensure that the value function
V (n0(·)) := sup
cˆ(·)∈U
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtu(cˆ(t))Nˆγ(t) dt
is finite (again we denoted with Nˆ(·) the trajectory related to the control cˆ(·)).
The proofs of the two results above follow the line of Propositions 2.1.10
and 2.1.11 in Fabbri and Gozzi (2008), proving that 0 ≤ V (n0) < +∞ using
an upper bound for every admissible strategy.
Once we know that the value function is finite we can prove another
crucial property of it: the γ-homogeneity.
Proposition 2.2 Assume that (15) is satisfied. Then, for every γ ∈ [0, 1]
the value function is positively homogeneous of degree γ i.e., for every n0(·) ∈
L2(−T, 0;R+) and λ0 > 0 we have
V (λ0n0(·)) := λγ0V (n0(·))
is finite (again we denoted with Nˆ(·) the trajectory related to the control cˆ(·)).
The proof is in Appendix B. This property helps understanding some of
the nontrivial results obtained along the paper.
We are now ready to provide the first important result of the paper high-
lighting the case of asymptotic extinction.
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2.3 A preliminary extinction result
We provide now a general extinction property inherent to our model. Recall
that when a
b
T ≤ 1, all the roots of the characteristic equation of the dynamic
equation describing maximal population, that is equation (12), have non-
positive real part, which may imply that maximal population goes to zero
asymptotically (asymptotic extinction). The next proposition shows that
this is actually the case for any admissible control in the case where a
b
T < 1.
Proposition 2.3 If a
b
T < 1 then for every admissible control n(·) the as-
sociated state trajectory N(·) satisfies
lim
t→+∞
N(t) = 0
i.e. it “drives the system to extinction”.
The proof is in the Appendix B. The value of individuals’ lifetime is
therefore crucial for the optimal (and non-optimal) population dynamics.
This is not really surprising: if people do not live long enough to bring in more
resources than it costs to raise them, then one might think that eventually
the population falls to zero. The proposition identifies indeed a threshold
value independent of the welfare function (and so independent in particular
of the strength of intertemporal altruism given by the parameter γ) such
that, if individuals’ lifetime is below this threshold, the population will vanish
asymptotically. While partly mechanical, the result has some interesting and
nontrivial aspects. First of all, one would claim that in a situation where an
individual costs more than what she brings to the economy, the optimal
population size could well be zero at finite time. Our result is only about
asymptotic extinction. As we shall show later, whether finite time extinction
could be optimal, that’s ethically legitimate, requires additional conditions,
notably on the degree of altruism. Precisely, we will show that finite time
extinction is always optimal in the Millian case while in the Benthamite case,
and even under a
b
T > 1, finite time or asymptotic extinction could be optimal
depending on other parameters of the model.
Second, the result is interesting in that it identifies an explicit and inter-
pretable threshold value, equal to b
a
, for individuals’ lifetime: the larger the
productivity of these individuals, the lower this threshold is, and the larger
the rearing costs, the larger the threshold is.18 An originally non-sustainable
18If T = ba , not all the admissible trajectories drive the system to extinction: indeed if
we have for example the constant initial datum N(t) = 1 for all t < 0 or n(t) = a/b for
all t < 0, the (admissible) maximal control NMAX(t) allows to maintain the population
constant equal to 1 for every t.
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economy can be made sustainable by two types of exogenous impulses: tech-
nological shocks (via a or b) or demographic shocks (via T ).19
Remark 2.1 Before getting to the analysis of the Millian Vs Benthamite social
welfare function, let us discuss briefly the robustness of our results in this section
to departures from the linearity assumptions made on the cost and production
functions. Introducing a strictly convex rearing function, say replacing bn by bnβ
with β > 1, will obviously not alter the message of the extinction Proposition
2.2 and 2.3. Things are apparently more involved if we move from the linear
production function Y = aN to Y = aNα , with α < 1. First note that in such
a case the resource constraint (5) becomes
aN(t)α = Y (t) = N(t)c(t) + bn(t)
that is
c(t) = aN(t)α−1 − b n(t)
N(t)
. (16)
The trajectory of maximum population growth (found taking c(t) ≡ 0) is now the
solution of
NMAX(t) =
∫ 0
(t−T )∧0
n0(s) ds+
a
b
∫ t
(t−T )∨0
NαMAX(s) ds.
This equation has two equilibrium points: N0 = 0 which is unstable, and N1 > 0
which is asymptotically stable and attracts all positive data. This implies that the
existence result of Proposition 2.1 holds for all ρ > 0 and the result of Proposition
2.3 does not hold.
3 The infinite lifetime case as a benchmark
In order to disentangle accurately the implications of finite lives, we start
with the standard case where agents live forever.
We shall use from now on explicit utility functions in order to get closed-form
solutions. More precisely, we choose the isoelastic function u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ with
σ ∈ (0, 1).20. With the latter utility function choice, the functional (11) can
19This is largely consistent with unified growth (positive) theory – see Galor and Weil
(1999), Galor and Moav (2002), and Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2002).
20The values considered for σ guarantee the positivity of the utility function. It might be
argued following Palivos and Yip (1993) that such values imply unrealistic figures for the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which require σ > 1. We show in the discussion
paper version of the paper that our main results still hold qualitatively on the utility func-
tion: u(c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ , whose positivity is compatible, under certain scale conditions, with
the more realistic σ > 1. See Section 3.2.2 at http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.
fr/docs/00/53/60/73/PDF/DTGREQAM2010_40.pdf.
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be rewritten as ∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(aN(t)− bn(t))1−σ
1− σ N
γ−(1−σ)(t) dt. (17)
Last but not least, it should be noted that our problem is not likely to
be concave for every value of γ because of endogenous fertility, and notably
the altruism term, Nγ, in the objective function. Indeed, one can straight-
forwardly show that the problem is concave if and only if γ ∈ [1 − σ, 1].
Throughout this paper, we shall use dynamic programming, which always
gives sufficient optimality conditions even in the absence of concavity.21
Let us see what happens in the limit case T = +∞. In this situation, the
problem reduces to maximizing the functional
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(
a− bn(t)
N(t)
)1−σ
1− σ N
γ(t) dt (18)
for the system driven by the state equation:
N˙(t) = n(t), N(0) = N0 (19)
and constraints n(t) ∈ [0, a
b
N(t)
]
for every t ≥ 0. We have the following
result:
Proposition 3.1 In the described limit case T = +∞, when the functional
is given by (18) the condition
ρ >
a
b
γ (20)
is necessary and sufficient to ensure the boundedness of the functional.
Moreover we have the following.
(i) If a
b
γ > ρ(1 − σ) (which implies γ > 0) then the optimal trajectory in
feedback form is given by n = θN where
θ :=
1
γσ
(a
b
γ − ρ(1− σ)
)
> 0.
The optimal trajectory and control can be written explicitly as N∗(t) =
N0e
θt and n∗(t) = θN0eθt > 0. The related trajectory of the per-capita
consumption is constant over time and is given by c∗(t) = a− bθ.
21Recall that Euler equations are not sufficient for optimality if concavity is not guar-
anteed. This said, we will use the latter for purpose of clarification and interpretation (of
course provided concavity is met).
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(ii) If a
b
γ ≤ ρ(1− σ) then the optimal control is n∗ ≡ 0, the optimal trajec-
tory is N∗(t) ≡ N0 and the optimal per-capita consumption is given by
c∗(t) ≡ a.
The proof is in Appendix B. This result allows to distinguish quite sharply
between the Millian and Benthamite cases. Actually, Proposition 3.1 goes
much beyond the two latter cases and highlights the role of the altruism
parameter, γ, in the optimal dynamics. In particular, the proposition identi-
fies a threshold value for the latter parameter, γ¯ = bρ(1−σ)
a
, under which the
optimal outcome is to never give birth to any additional individual, so that
population size is always equal to its initial level (permanent zero fertility
case). This already means that for fixed cost, technological and preference
parameters, a Millian planner will always choose this permanent zero fer-
tility rule. In contrast, a Benthamite planner can choose to implement a
nonzero fertility rule, leading to growing population (and production) over
time provided: (i) the productivity parameter a is large enough, and/or (ii)
the cost parameter b is small enough, and/or (iii) the time discount rate ρ
(resp. σ) is small (resp. large ) enough, which are straightforward economic
conditions. The same happens for impure altruism cases (0 < γ < 1) al-
though in such cases the “compensation”, in terms of productivity or cost
for example, should be higher with respect to the Benthamite case for the
planner to launch a growing population regime. An interesting special case is
γ = 1−σ, which will be shown to have some peculiar analytical implications
under finite lives in Section 5, ultimately allowing to get a closed-form solu-
tion to the optimal dynamics. For comparison with Section 5, let us isolate
this case.
Corollary 3.1 Under γ = 1 − σ, and provided ρ ≤ a
b
< ρ
γ
, case (i) of
Propostion 3.1 applies.
A much more intriguing property is that consumption per capita is con-
stant over time whatever the value of γ ≥ 0. In other words, all the social
welfare functions parameterized by γ optimally assure “equal consumption
per capital for all individuals and all generations”. That is egalitarianism
does not discriminate between these social welfare functions. Whatever the
position of γ with respect to γ¯, consumption per capita is constant for all in-
dividuals to be born. Below the threshold, including the Millian case γ = 0,
consumption is maximal and procreation suboptimal: offsprings are system-
atically traded for more consumption. More altruistic benevolent planners
(γ > γ¯) would implement a different optimal policy: procreation is opti-
mal but the egalitarian consumption per capita is lower compared to the
less altruistic planners ((γ < γ¯). As a consequence, growth is only optimal
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in the former case. While broadly consistent with the pro-natalist (Resp.
anti-natalist) bias of the Benthamite (Resp. Millian) criterion, the finding
that our strict concept of egalitarianism holds for every value of the altruism
parameter is striking enough. We explain it here below.
It is important to note that this finding derives entirely from the fact that
the optimal size of new cohorts relative to the size of total population, that
is n(t)
N(t)
, is constant, equal to parameter θ. We shall interpret this ratio as a
reproduction or fertility rate. It should be also noted that the proposition
implies that this ratio is increasing in γ since σ < 1, which is consistent:
the larger the altruism parameter, the larger the fertility rate chosen by the
planner. The fact that the optimal fertility ratio is constant whatever the
altruism parameter (provided growth is optimal) is indeed intriguing. One
way to understand how intriguing it is is to search for some formal equivalence
with the standard AK model. One can readily show that the case γ = 1− σ
studied in the Corollary just above is formally identical to the standard AK
model with zero capital depreciation where the investment to capital ratio
plays the role of the fertility rate in our model.22 Therefore, the constancy of
the optimal fertility rate is a mere consequence of the AK (or AN) structure
in the case of the Corollary.
So why optimal fertility is constant for every γ compatible with growth
in our setting? One way to visualize this case better is to compute the first-
order conditions of our optimal control problem when concavity is ensured.23
As mentioned above, our optimal control problem is concave if and only if
1 − σ ≤ γ ≤ 1, thus including the AK-equivalent value γ = 1 − σ and the
Benthamite configuration. In particular, the problem is strictly concave when
1−σ < γ ≤ 1 ensuring uniqueness in the cases which are not AK-equivalent.
Let us rewrite our problem slightly to put forward the fertility rate m = n
N
as the control variable. The objective function becomes∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(a− bm(t))1−σ
1− σ N
γ(t) dt
and the state equation: N˙(t) = m(t)N(t), with N(0) = N0 given. If λ(t) is
the adjoint (or co-state) variable, the first-order necessary (and sufficient by
22Indeed, one can see that in this case the AK model amounts to maximizing the func-
tional
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(A− i(t)K(t) )
1−σ
1−σ K
1−σ(t) dt under the state equation K˙(t) = i(t). Therefore,
our problem is formally identical to this AK model if and only if γ = 1− σ.
23We restrict our analysis to the concave case for convenience. It goes without saying
that our proof of Proposition 3.1. extends the sufficiency of these first-order conditions to
the non-concave parameterizations.
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concavity) conditions are:
λ = b(a− bm)−σ Nγ−1 e−ρt,
−λ˙ = λm+ γ (a− bm)
1−σ
1− σ N
γ−1 e−ρt,
with the transversality condition limt→+∞ λN = 0. The first equation is
the optimality condition for the current value Hamiltonian with respect to
m: it leads to equalizing the adjoint variable and the marginal (dis)utility
of the fertility rate divided by N .24 The second equation is the adjoint or
Euler equation: as usual it stipulates that the decrease in the (social) value
of an individual should reflects its future and present contributions to social
welfare, the second term of the sum in the right-hand side representing obvi-
ously the contemporaneous impact on welfare of an additional individual. It
is trivial to eliminate the co-state variable by differentiating the first condi-
tion with respect to time and substituting it in the adjoint equation. Using
the state equation N˙(t) = m(t)N(t), one can show after trivial but tedious
computations that the dynamics of the fertility rate are independent of the
actual size of population, which is the crucial property of the model under
infinite lives. Indeed, one can easily show that these dynamics are driven by:
m˙ = κ (a− bm) (θ −m),
where κ is a constant depending on the parameters of the model, and θ is
given in the Proposition 3.1. Under strict concavity of the problem, which
occurs for example in the Benthamite case as explained above, the solution
m(t) = θ, ∀t is therefore the unique solution to the problem as proved in
the latter proposition. As one can see, this property comes from the fact
that the dynamics of the fertility rate m are independent of the population
size, N , and this property is true whatever the strength of altruism measured
by γ. Such an outcome is totally non-trivial: an increase of N for given λ
does increase the fertility rate by the first-order condition with respect to m
shown above, but as fertility goes up, the marginal value of population, that
is λ, drops when γ > 1−σ,25which covers the case where the optimal control
problem is concave, inducing a second round effect on m. Our main result
therefore implies that this second round effect exactly cancels the former first
round effect given the specifications of our model.
24That is because we use the auxiliary control m instead of the original n: an increase
in n by 1 increases N by 1 but an increase in m by 1 increases N by actual N .
25Trivial computations lead to :− λ˙λ = (1− γ1−σ ) m+ γab(1−σ) .
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The analysis above of the infinite life case is a useful benchmark. We
shall examine hereafter the finite life case, and show how the latter changes
the results. We can already anticipate one interesting conceptual difference:
while extinction cannot be even feasible in the infinite life case (since the size
of cohorts are not allowed to be negative), the latter is a potential outcome
when individuals don’t leave for ever. In particular, if the zero fertility (or
zero procreation) regime uncovered for example in the Millian case in the
benchmark case turns out to be also optimal under finite lives, it would lead
to extinction, which is another type of “repugnant conclusion”, inherent to
the Millian criterion in this case, as mentioned in the introduction. More
importantly, it goes without saying that the main property outlined in the
benchmark case, that is the independence of fertility rate dynamics of the
actual size of population, is not guaranteed to hold under finite lives: while
there is no population destruction or “depreciation” when individuals’ life-
time is infinite, we do have such a phenomenon under finite span. Indeed,
one could write the law of motion of population size as:
N˙ = n(t)− δ(t) n(t),
where δ(t) = n(t−T )
n(t)
is the endogenous population “destruction” rate implied
by our model. In the benchmark case, this rate was nil, it is endogenous in
the finite life case.
4 Egalitarism and optimal population dy-
namics under finite lives
In this section, we perform the traditional comparison between the outcomes
of the polar Benthamite Vs Millian cases. Nonetheless, our comparison
sharply departs from the existing work (like in Nerlove et al., 1985, or Palivos
and Yip, 1993) in that we are able to extract a closed-form solution to optimal
dynamics, and therefore we compare the latter. Traditional comparison work
only considers steady states.26 This focus together with the finite lifetime
specification allows to derive several new results.
4.1 The Millian case, γ = 0, under finite lives
This case can be treated straightforwardly once Definition 2.1 is brought into
the analysis. Indeed, in the absence of intertemporal altruism, the functional
26As mentioned above, Palivos and Yip have an AK model, so their model does not
display transition dynamics.
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(11) reduces to∫ +∞
0
e−ρtu(c(t)) dt =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtu
(
aN(t)− bn(t)
N(t)
)
dt, . (21)
and, since c(t) ∈ [0, a] for all t ≥ 0, the following claim is straightforward.
Proposition 4.1 Consider the problem of maximizing (11) with γ = 0
subject to the state equation (3) and the constraint (9). Then the optimal
control is given by n∗(t) = 0 for every t ≥ 0, so that, from (6) and Definition
2.1, c∗(t) = a for every t ≥ 0 (even after extinction). So the value function
is constant for every n0(·) and its value and equal to u(a)ρ .
Since the objective function depends only on consumption, and since it
is increasing in the latter, the optimal control n∗(t) ≡ 0, or equivalently
c∗(t) ≡ a, is natural: in the Millian case, it is not optimal to procreate. A
direct implication of this property is finite-time extinction:
Corollary 4.1 For the solution of the optimal control problem described in
Proposition 4.1, population extinction occurs at a certain time t¯ ≤ T .
Some comments are in order here. First, just like the benchmark case
with infinite life span, the Millian criterion is compatible with our egalitar-
ian concept: all individuals to be born receive the same (maximal) consump-
tion. Second, and also consistently with previous section, the absence of
intertemporal altruism makes procreation sub-optimal at any date, there-
fore legitimating extinction at finite time, as predicted. And this property
is independent of the deep parameters of the problem: it is independent of
the value of individuals’ lifetime, T , of the value of intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (determined by σ), and of the technological parameters, a and b.
One would think that a higher enough labor productivity, a, and/or a lower
enough marginal cost, b, would make procreation optimal at least along a
transition period. This does not occur at all. Much more than in the AK
model built up by Palivos and Yip, our benchmark enhances the implications
of intertemporal altruism, which will imply a much sharper distinction be-
tween the outcomes of the Millian Vs Benthamite cases. This will be clarified
in the next section. Before, it is worth pointing out that Proposition 4.1 is
robust to departures from linearity. Indeed, the finite-time extinction result
does not at all depend on the linear cost function, bn(t), adopted. Even if
we consider a more general cost C(n(t)), the behavior of the system does not
change in the Millian case: in this case the production would be again equal
to Y (t) = aN(t), resulting in c(t) = a − C(n(t))/N(t), so, any admissible
function C(·) would work (for example C(0) = 0 and C(·) increasing and
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strictly convex): again optimal c(t) should be picked in the interval [0, a],
and as before, one would have to choose c(t) = a or n(t) = 0, leading to
finite-time extinction.
Last but not least, it is worth pointing out that the optimal finite time
extinction property identified here holds also under decreasing returns: the
result described in Proposition 4.1 can be replicated without changes. Again
only per-capita consumption enters the utility function and again the highest
per-capita consumption is obtained taking n ≡ 0. Note that, differently
from the linear case, here the per-capita consumption is not bounded by a
but, when the population approaches to extinction, thanks to (16), tends to
infinity, so in a sense the incentive to choose n = 0 is even greater.
4.2 The Benthamite case, γ = 1, under finite lives
We now come to the Benthamite case. This case is much more complicated
than the first one. In particular, the mathematics needed to characterize the
optimal dynamics is complex, relying on advanced dynamic programming
techniques in infinite-dimensioned Hilbert spaces. Technical details are given
in Appendix A. The same technique is used to handle the impure altruism
case studied in the next section. Here, since γ = 1, the functional (17)
simplifies into ∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(aN(t)− bn(t))1−σ
1− σ N
σ(t) dt. (22)
For the value-function to be bounded, we can use the general sufficient con-
dition (15): when γ = 1, it amounts to
ρ > ξ. (23)
Recall that we have ξ = 0 when (13) does not have any strictly positive roots,
i.e. when a
b
T ≤ 1. Moreover, if we define
β :=
a
b
(1− e−ρT ), (24)
then equation (23) implies27
ρ > β > ξ and
ρ
1− e−ρT >
a
b
. (25)
The following theorem states a sufficient parametric condition ensuring the
existence of an optimal control and characterizes it.
27see e.g. Fabbri and Gozzi 2008, equation (15).
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Theorem 4.1 Consider the functional (22) with σ ∈ (0, 1). Assume that
(23) holds and let β given by (24). Then there exists a unique optimal control
n∗(·).
• If
β ≤ ρ(1− σ) ⇐⇒ ρ
1− e−ρT ≥
a
b
· 1
1− σ , (26)
then the optimal control is n∗(·) ≡ 0 and we have extinction at time T .
• If
β > ρ(1− σ) ⇐⇒ ρ
1− e−ρT <
a
b
· 1
1− σ , (27)
then we call
θ :=
a
b
· β − ρ(1− σ)
βσ
=
a
b
[
1
σ
− ρ(1− σ)
βσ
]
=
1
σ
a
b
+
ρ
1− e−ρT
(
1− 1
σ
)
(28)
and we have θ ∈ (0 , a
b
). The optimal control n∗(·) and the related
trajectory N∗(·) satisfy
n∗(t) = θN∗(t). (29)
Along the optimal trajectory the per-capita consumption is constant and
its value is
c∗(t) =
aN∗(t)− bn∗(t)
N∗(t)
= a− bθ ∈ (0, a) for all t ≥ 0. (30)
Moreover the optimal control n∗(·) is the unique solution of the follow-
ing delay differential equation
n˙(t) = θ (n(t)− n(t− T )) , for t ≥ 0
n(0) = θN0
n(s) = n0(s), for all s ∈ [−T, 0).
(31)
The proof is in Appendix A. In contrast to the Millian case, there is
now room for optimal procreation, and therefore for both demographic and
economic growth. When γ = 1, intertemporal altruism is maximal, and
such an ingredient may be strong enough in certain circumstances (to be
specified) to offset the anti-procreation forces isolated in the analysis of the
Millian case. Some comments on the optimal control identified are in order
here specially in comparison with the benchmark infinite lifetime case.
25
1. First of all, one has to notice that the condition for growth in Theorem
4.1, β > ρ(1 − σ) leads exactly to the growth condition uncovered in
the benchmark infinite lives case by making T going to infinity and
putting γ = 1. The same can be claimed on the optimal constant
fertility rate, θ, which now depends on individuals’ lifetime: it is an
increasing function of life spans and it converges to the constant fertility
rate identified in the benchmark case when T goes to infinity and γ =
1. Notice that the longer individuals’ lives, the larger the fertility
rate since individuals’ are active for a longer time in our model. This
anti-demographic transition mechanism can be counter-balanced if one
introduces fixed labor time and costly pensions. This extension goes
beyond the objectives of this paper.
2. Second, and related to the previous comparison point, the Benthamite
case with finite lives displays qualitatively the same growth regime as
in the benchmark infinite lifetime case: both consumption per capita
and the fertility rate are constant over time. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 3, such an outcome is far from obvious: finite lives introduce a
depreciation term in the law of motion of population size, which does
not exist when people live forever, and it is unclear that the state in-
dependence property outlined in the benchmark for fertility optimal
dynamics can survive to this depreciation term. Theorem 4.1 shows
that it does. However, we shall show in Section 5 that in contrast
to the infinite lifetime case, the constancy of the optimal fertility rate
and the corresponding intergenerational egalitarian consumption rule
do not necessarily hold under impure altruism, and seems specific to
the Benthamite social welfare function. This is consistent with Propo-
sition 2.2 establishing the γ-homogeneity of the value function of our
program. In particular, the value function is linear in the Benthamite
case: in such a case, the optimal policy in feedback form is also linear,
leading to the optimality of the egalitarian solution in this case. When
γ < 1, the value function is nonlinear, and as we shall see in the next
section, the optimal policy in feedback form need not be linear.
3. Third, one has to notice that finite time extinction is also a possible op-
timal outcome in the Benthamite case. In other words, the Benthamite
criterion is not necessarily pro-natalist: in particular, if life spans are
small enough, this criterion would legitimate finite time extinction just
like to anti-natalist Millian criterion. Actually, finite time optimal ex-
tinction occurs when parameter β is low enough. By definition, this
parameter measures a kind of adjusted productivity of the individual:
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productivity, a, is adjusted for the fact that individuals live a finite life
(through the term 1 − e−ρT ), and also for the rearing costs they have
to pay along their lifetime. If this adjusted productivity parameter
is too small, the economy goes to extinction at finite time. And this
possibility is favored by larger time discount rates and intertemporal
elasticities of substitution (under σ < 1). Longer lives, better produc-
tivity and lower rearing costs can allow to escape from this scenario,
although even in such cases, the economy is not sure to avoid extinction
asymptotically (see Proposition 4.2 below). In particular, it is readily
shown that condition (27), ruling out finite time extinction, is fulfilled
if and only if T > T0, where T0 = −(1/ρ) ln (1− ρ(1− σ)b/a) is the
threshold value induced by (27), which depends straightforwardly on
the parameters of the model.
4. Finally it is worth pointing out that there is a major difference be-
tween the finite life Benthamite case and the benchmark infinite life
case: while the latter does not exihibit any transitional dynamics, the
former does. Equation (31) gives the optimal dynamics of cohort’s size
n(t). This linear delay differential equation is similar to the one ana-
lyzed by Boucekkine et al. (2005) and Fabbri and Gozzi (2008). The
dynamics depend on the initial function, n0(t), and on the parameters
θ and T in a way that will be described below. They are generally
oscillatory reflecting replacement echoes as in the traditional vintage
capital theory (see Boucekkine et al., 1997). In our model, the mecha-
nism of generation replacement induced by finite life spans is the engine
of these oscillatory transitions.
We now dig deeper in the dynamic properties and asymptotics of optimal
trajectories. The following proposition summarizes the key points.
Proposition 4.2 Consider the functional (22) with σ ∈ (0, 1). Assume
that (23) and (27) hold, so θ ∈ (0 , a
b
). Then
- If θT < 1 then n∗(t) (and then N∗(·)) goes to 0 exponentially.
- If θT > 1 then the characteristic equation of (31)
z = θ
(
1− e−zT ) , (32)
has a unique strictly positive solution h belonging to (0, θ) while all the
other roots have negative real part; h is an increasing function of T .
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Moreover the population and cohort sizes both converge to an exponen-
tial solution at rate h28:
lim
t→∞
n∗(t)
eht
=
θ
1− T (θ − h)
∫ 0
−T
(
1− e(−s−T )h)n0(s) ds > 0
and
lim
t→∞
N∗(t)
eht
=
1− e−hT
h
θ
1− T (θ − h)
∫ 0
−T
(
1− e(−s−T )h)n0(s) ds > 0
Finally, convergence is generally non-monotonic.
The proof is in Appendix B. The proposition above highlights the dynamic
and asymptotic properties of the optimal control when finite time extinction
is ruled out, that it is when T > T0.
Indeed the proposition adds another threshold value T1 > T0 on individ-
uals’ lifetime: we have extinction in finite time when T < T0, asymptotic
extinction when individuals’ lifetime is between T0 and T1, population and
economic growth when T > T1. Notice that the emergence of asymptotic
extinction is consistent with Proposition 2.229 and that it is new with re-
spect to the Millian case where optimal extinction takes place at finite time
whatever the individuals’ lifetime.30 It is very interesting to note that even
in the case of asymptotic extinction, the Benthamite criterion does assure
egalitarism in the sense of “equal consumption per capital for all individuals
and all generations”: though population size goes to zero as time increases
indefinitely, consumption per capita is constant along the transition by equa-
tions (29) and (30) of Theorem 4.1. Therefore, it is good to observe here that
the asymptotic extinction case unconvered here does not correspond to the
transposition of the Millian extinction case (or the Benthamite case for low
enough lifetimes) when t goes to infinity: consumption per capita is always
constant, equal to a− b θ < a, it is never maximal in contrast to the Millian
solution.
The existence of such second threshold T1 would be trivial if θ be inde-
pendent of T . Since θ do depend on T the argument can be made precise
observing that the function T 7→ Tθ(T ) is always strictly increasing in T .
This allows to formulate the following important result.
28Observe that
(
1− e(−s−T )h) is always positive for s ∈ [−T, 0] and the constant
1
1−T (θ−h) can be easily proved to be positive too.
29Here the threshold is indeed larger than the one identified in Proposition 2.2, see
Corollary 4.2
30Of course, in this case, the longer the lifetime, the later extinction will take place.
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Corollary 4.2 Under the conditions of Theorem 3.1, there exist two thresh-
old values for individuals’ lifetime, T0 and T1, 0 < T0 < T1 such that:
1. for T ≤ T0, finite-time extinction is optimal,
2. for T0 < T < T1, asymptotic extinction is optimal,
3. for T > T1, economic and demographic growth (at positive rate) is
optimal.
Proposition 4.2 brings indeed further important results. If individuals’
lifetime is large enough (i.e. above the threshold T1), then both the cohort
size and population size will grow asymptotically at a strictly positive rate.
In other words, these two variables will go to traditional balanced growth
paths (BGPs). Proposition 4.2 shows that the longer the lifetime, the higher
the BGP growth rate, which is a quite natural outcome of our setting. More-
over, consistently with standard endogenous growth theory, the levels of the
BGPs depend notably on the initial conditions, here the initial function n0(t).
Proposition 4.2 derives explicitly these long-run levels and their dependence
on the initial datum is explicitly given.
We now examine a case of impure altruism.
5 A case of impure altruism
A crucial question arising from the findings of the previous section is how
the huge gap between the outcomes of the Millian and the Benthamite cases
is altered when the intertemporal altruism parameter γ varies in (0 , 1). In
this section we study the intermediate case γ = 1− σ since it is a good and
“cheap” way to address such crucial question. Indeed from the mathematical
point of view, and in contrast to the case γ = 1 handled above (and to the
case γ 6= 1 − σ), the case γ = (1 − σ) leads to the same infinitely dimen-
sioned optimal control problem solved out explicitly by Fabbri and Gozzi
(2008) using dynamic programming.31 Moreover, by varying σ in (0 , 1), one
31Indeed, these authors identified a closed-form solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation induced by the optimal growth model with AK technology and “one-hoss-shay”
depreciation, i.e. all machines of any vintage are operated during a fixed time T . The
objective function (with obvious notations) is
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt (ak(t)−i(t))
1−σ
1−σ dt under the state
equation k(t) =
∫ t
t−T i(τ) dτ , which is formally identically to our problem if and only if
γ = 1− σ .
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can extract some insightful lessons on the outcomes of our optimal control
problem for any γ in (0 , 1).32
The answer we find to our crucial question is that, for γ ∈ (0 , 1), the
optimal dynamics show some similarities with the Benthamite case concern-
ing notably the optimal extinction properties and the oscillatory dynamics
exhibited by population and cohort’s sizes but they are also quite different
in some aspects like the optimal consumption and fertility rate dynamics. 33
As in the previous sections, we consider the optimal control problem of
maximizing the objective function∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(aN(t)− bn(t))1−σ
1− σ dt. (33)
over n(·) ∈ Un0 . Also, as discussed in Subsection 2.2, we call ξ the unique
strictly positive root of equation
z =
a
b
(
1− e−zT ) ,
if it exists, otherwise we pose ξ = 0. From Subsection 2.2, we know that
ξ > 0 if individuals’ lifetime is large enough: T > b
a
. The condition (15)
needed for the boundedness of the value function becomes:
ρ > ξ(1− σ). (34)
It is then possible to characterize the optimal control of our problem as
follows:
Theorem 5.1 Consider the optimal control problem driven by (3), with
constraint (8) and functional (33). If (34) and the following condition
(needed to rule out corner solutions)
ρ− ξ(1− σ)
σ
≤ a
b
(35)
are satisfied, then, along the unique optimal trajectory n∗(·) and the related
optimal trajectory N∗(·), we have
n∗(t) =
a
b
N∗(t)− Λegt (36)
32In contrast to the infinite life case, we have found no way to identify an explicit solution
to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation under finite lives for any value of the altruism
parameter, γ.
33This fact can be also assessed (with some hard mathematical work) in the case γ 6=
1 − σ studying the qualitative properties of the optimal dynamics through the dynamic
programming approach.
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where
g :=
ξ − ρ
σ
(37)
and
Λ :=
(
ρ− ξ(1− σ)
σ
· a
bξ
)(∫ 0
−T
(
1− eξr)n0(r) dr) .
Moreover n∗(·) is characterized as the unique solution of the following delay
differential equation:
n˙(t) =
a
b
(n(t)− n(t− T ))− gΛegt, t ≥ 0
n(0) = a
b
(N0 − Λ)
n(r) = n0(r), r ∈ [−T, 0).
The proof is in Appendix B, it is a simple adaptation of previous work of
Fabbri and Gozzi (2008). The closed-form solution identified allows indeed
for a much finer characterization of this impure altruism case. For example,
one can show in detail how close this case is to the Benthamite configuration
studied in Section 4.1. Indeed, condition (35) rules out finite time extinction
as an optimal outcome: if it is not verified, we get, as in Section 4.2, a
case of optimal finite time extinction. Since the root ξ is an increasing
function of the life span T ,34 one can also interpret condition (35) as putting
a first threshold value for T below which finite extinction is optimal. Above
this first threshold, either sustainable positively growing or asymptotically
vanishing populations (and economies) are optimal. In particular, note that
when T < b
a
, ξ = 0 and therefore g < 0: in this case we necessarily have
asymptotic extinction. Sustainable growth is not guaranteed even if T > b
a
because even if in this case the root ξ > 0, it is not necessarily bigger than ρ
for g to be necessarily positive. Just like in the Benthamite case, there exist
a second threshold value of life span above which positive growth is optimal.
Two important comments should be made here. First of all, one can see
that the properties extracted in the theorem above are not applicable to the
limit case γ = 1 because this amounts to study the limit case σ = 0: in the
latter case, magnitudes, like the growth rate g given in equation (37), are not
defined. In contrast, the theorem can be used to study possible dynamics
of optimal controls when γ is close to zero, or when σ is close to one (but
not equal to 1 of course). When γ = 0, we know from Section 4.1 that we
have optimal extinction at finite-time whatever the value of σ > 0 (that’s
34A formal statement and proof of this claim can be found in Proposition 4.2 of
the earlier version of the paper quoted before, and available at: http://halshs.
archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/53/60/73/PDF/DTGREQAM2010_40.pdf.
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the “repugnant conclusion” for the Millian social welfare function). Theorem
5.1 shows that when γ is close to zero (but not equal to zero), finite-time
extinction is not the unique optimal outcome: population may even grow at
a rate close to g = ξ − ρ which might well be positive if the lifetime T is
large enough (see a finer characterization below). In this sense, the impure
altruism cases considered mimic to a large extent the properties identified
for the Benthamite configuration.
Much more importantly, Theorem 5.1 highlights a crucial specificity of
the latter case. Indeed a major difference comes from the fact that the
fertility rate can be hardly constant when altruism is imperfect given the
γ-homogeneity property demonstrated in Proposition 2.2. As a consequence,
per capita consumption cannot be constant (when finite time extinction is
ruled out). Recall that, in the Benthamite case, optimal consumption per
capita and the fertility rate are constant and independent of the initial pro-
creation profile when growth is optimal: our egalitarism principle is ensured.
This reflects the specificity of the latter case: when intertemporal altruism
is maximal, the social planner abstracts from the initial conditions when
fixing optimal consumption level and the fertility rate. Under intermediate
altruism, the planner takes into account the initial data, and the optimal
dynamics of the latter variables do adjust to this data: optimal consumption
per capita (and fertility rates) cannot be constant in general, and therefore
our egalitarism principle is not generally compatible with impure altruism
under finite lifetimes. Notice finally that the fact that optimal fertility rate
and per capita consumption are non-constant in the impure altruism case
goes at odds with the findings of Corollary 3.1: when γ = 1 − σ, the latter
variables are constant (no transition dynamics) in the benchmark infinite
time case. That’s to say, finite life spans do significantly matter! Another
and more direct way to get this crucial aspect is to visualize the role of popu-
lation’s age distribution, which is irrelevant when lifetimes are infinite. Here
observe that the younger the population, the higher the value of Λ. There-
fore, the optimal decision n(t) = aN(t)/b − Λegt means that for a younger
population an higher per-capita consumption and a lower fertility are opti-
mal in the short-run. Still, as it will be shown below, the latter quantities are
independent in the long run of the initial age-distribution of the population
and the age-share profile converges to the “exponential” one.
Finally the transition dynamics in the impure altruism case can be de-
scribed in detail.
Proposition 5.1 Under the hypotheses of Theorem 5.1 the following limits
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exist
lim
t→∞
n∗(t)
egt
=: nL
and
lim
t→∞
N∗(t)
egt
=: NL.
Moreover, if g 6= 0 we have:
nL =
Λ
a
bg
(1− e−gT )− 1
and
NL =
b
a
(nL + Λ) =
Λ(1− e−gT )
a
b
(1− e−gT )− g = nL ·
1− e−gT
g
.
In particular, if ρ > ξ in the long run N(t) and n(t) go to zero exponentially;
if ρ < ξ, they grow exponentially with rate g defined in (37). If ρ = ξ they
stabilize respectively to nL and NL. Moreover
lim
t→∞
c∗(t) = lim
t→∞
aN∗(t)− bn∗(t)
N∗(t)
= a− bg
1− e−gT .
Finally c(t), detrended n(t) and detrended N(t) exhibit oscillatory con-
vergence to their respective asymptotic values.
The proposition shows that, as in the Benthamite case and despite the
extra non-autonomous term, the economy will converge to a balanced growth
path at rate g given in equation (37). As before, the long-run levels corre-
sponding to total population and cohort sizes depend on the initial procre-
ation profile via the parameter Λ. It should be noted here that despite the
latter feature, both per capita consumption and the fertility rate are inde-
pendent of the parameter Λ in the long-run. Therefore, and though the two
latter variables do show up transition dynamics, they converge to magnitudes
which are independent of the initial conditions, contrary to the traditional
AK model.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how egalitarism in consumption within and
across generations could be compatible with the optimal population size con-
cepts produced by different social welfare functions. First, we have shown
that egalitarism does not discriminate between the social welfare functions
considered in the benchmark case where life spans are infinite. In contrast,
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egalitarism ceases to be systematically optimal as we move to the finite life-
time assumption. In particular, the final outcome depends on the degree of
altruism, and also on the magnitude of the life span. In particular, to be
enforced in a growing economy, that is when population growth is optimal in
the long-run, this egalitarian rule can only hold when (i) the welfare function
is Benthamite, (ii) and for a large enough life span. When altruism is impure,
egalitarism is impossible in the context of a growing economy. Either in the
Millian case, whatever the life span, or in the Benthamite/impure altruism
cases, for small enough life spans, procreation is never optimal, leading to
finite time extinction and maximal consumption for all existing individuals.
Of course, our analytical approach cannot be trivially adapted to handle
natural extensions of our model (through the introduction of capital accu-
mulation or natural resources for example, or the incorporation of nonlinear
production functions). We believe however that this first step into the analy-
sis of optimal dynamics in optimal population size problems is an important
enrichment of the ongoing debate. It is especially interesting because it fol-
lows from a very natural assumption: individuals have finite lives, and this
feature can only be crucial for the outcomes of the optimal population size
problem.
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A The case γ = 1: the infinite-dimensional
setting and the proof of Theorem 4.1
We denote by L2(−T, 0) the space of all functions f from [−T, 0] to R that
are Lebesgue measurable and such that
∫ 0
−T |f(x)|2 dx < +∞. It is an Hilbert
space when endowed with the scalar product 〈f, g〉L2 =
∫ 0
−T f(x)g(x) dx. We
consider the Hilbert space M2 := R × L2(−T, 0) (with the scalar product
〈(x0, x1), (z0, z1)〉M2 := x0z0 + 〈x1, z1〉L2). Following Bensoussan et al. (2007)
(see Chapter II-4 and in particular Theorem 5.1), given an admissible control n(·)
and the related trajectory N(·), if we define x(t) = (x0(t), x1(t)) ∈M2 for all t ≥ 0
as {
x0(t) := N(t)
x1(t)[r] := −n(t− T − r), for all r ∈ [−T, 0), (38)
we have that x(t) satisfies the following evolution equation in M2:
x˙(t) = A∗x(t) +B∗n(t). (39)
where A∗ is the adjoint of the generator of a C0-semigroup35 A defined as36{
D(A)
def
= {(ψ0, ψ1) ∈M2 : ψ1 ∈W 1,2(−T, 0), ψ0 = ψ1(0)}
A : D(A)→M2, A(ψ0, ψ1) def= (0, ddsψ1)
(40)
and B∗ is the adjoint of B : D(A) → R defined as B(ψ0, ψ1) := (ψ1[0]− ψ1[−T ]).
Moreover, using the new variable x ∈M2 defined in (38) we can rewrite the welfare
functional as ∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(ax0(t)− bn(t))1−σ
1− σ x
σ
0 (t) dt.
Our optimal control problem of maximizing the welfare functional (22) over the
set Un0 defined in (10) with the state equation (3) can be equivalently rewritten as
35See e.g. Pazy (1983) for a standard reference to the argument.
36W 1,2(−T, 0) is the set {f ∈ L2(−T, 0) : ∂ωf ∈ L2(−T, 0)} where ∂ωf is the distribu-
tional derivative of f .
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the problem of maximizing the functional above with the state equation (39) over
the same set Un0 (if we read x0 instead of N in the definition (10)). The value
function V depends now on the new variable x that can be expressed in term of the
datum n0 using (38) for t = 0. The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
for the unknown v is37:
ρv(x) = 〈x,ADv〉M2 + sup
n∈[0,ab x0]
(
nBDv(x) +
(ax0 − bn)1−σ
1− σ x
σ
0
)
. (41)
As far as
BDv > a−σb (42)
the supremum appearing in (41) is a maximum and the unique maximum point is
strictly positive (since x0 > 0) and is
nmax :=
a
b
(
1−
(
BDv(x)
a−σb
)−1/σ)
x0 (43)
so (41) can be rewritten as
ρv(x) = 〈x,ADv〉M2 +
a
b
x0BDv(x) +
σ
1− σx0
(
1
b
BDv(x)
)1− 1
σ
. (44)
When
BDv ≤ a−σb (45)
then the supremum appearing in (41) is a maximum and the unique maximum
point is nmax := 0. In this case (41) can be rewritten as
ρv(x) = 〈x,ADv〉M2 +
a1−σx0
1− σ (46)
We expect that the value function of the problem is a (the) solution of the HJB
equation. Since it is not hard to see that the value function is 1-homogeneous, we
look for a linear solution of the HJB equation. We have the following result:
Proposition A.1 Suppose that (23) (and then (25)) holds and σ ∈ (0, 1). If
β > ρ(1− σ) (47)
then the function
v(x) := α1
(
x0 +
∫ 0
−T
x1(r)e
ρr dr
)
(48)
where
α1 = a
1−σ 1
β
(
1− σ
σ
· ρ− β
β
)−σ
37Dv is the Gateaux derivative.
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is a solution of (44) in all the points s.t. x0 > 0.
On the other side, if
β ≤ ρ(1− σ) (49)
then the function
v(x) := α2
(
x0 +
∫ 0
−T
x1(r)e
ρr dr
)
(50)
where
α2 =
a1−σ
ρ(1− σ)
is a solution of (46) in all the points s.t. x0 > 0.
Proof. Let i = 1, 2. We first observe that the function v is C1 (since it is linear).
Setting φ(r) = eρr, r ∈ [−T, 0] we see that its first derivative is constant and is
Dv(x) = αi(1, φ) for all x ∈M2
Looking at (40) we also see that such derivative belongs to D(A) so that all the
terms in (41) make sense. We have ADv(x) = (0, αiρφ) and BDv(x) = αi(1 −
e−ρT ). Then, thanks to (47) (resp. (49)) we have that (42) (resp. (45)) is satisfied
and (41) can be written in the form (44) (resp. (46)). To verify the statement we
have only to check it directly: the left hand side of (44) (resp. (46)) is equal to
ραi (x0 + 〈x1, φ〉L2). The right hand side is, for i = 1,
〈x1, α1ρφ〉L2 +
a
b
x0α1(1− e−ρT ) + σ
1− σx0
(
1
b
α1(1− e−ρT )
)1− 1
σ
= 〈x1, α1ρφ〉L2 + x0α1β +
σ
1− σx0
(
α1β
a
)1− 1
σ
= 〈x1, α1ρφ〉L2 + x0
α1β
a
[
1 +
σ
1− σ
(
α1β
a
)− 1
σ
]
.
Since the expression in square brackets is equal to aρ/β thanks to the definition
of α1, we have the claim for i = 1. For i = 2 the right hand side of (46) is (using
the expression of α2 above)
〈x1, α2ρφ〉L2 +
a1−σ
1− σx0 = 〈x1, α2ρφ〉L2 + α2ρx0
and this proves the claim for i = 2.
Once we have a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation we can prove
that it is the value function and so use it to find a solution of our optimal control
problem in feedback form.
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Theorem A.1 Suppose that (23) (and then (25)) holds and σ ∈ (0, 1). If (47)
holds then the function v defined in (48) is the value function V and there exists
a unique optimal control/trajectory. The optimal control n∗(·) and the related
trajectory x∗(·) satisfy the following equation:
n∗(t) =
a
b
(
1− (α1β)−
1
σ
)
x∗0(t) = θx
∗
0(t) (51)
where θ is given by (28). If (49) is satisfied then the function v defined in (50)
is the value function V and there exist a unique optimal control/trajectory. The
optimal control n∗(·) is identically zero.
Proof. The proof follows the arguments of the one of Proposition 2.3.2. in Fabbri
and Gozzi (2008) with various modifications due to peculiarity of our problem. We
do not write the details for brevity.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Theorem 4.1 is nothing but Theorem A.1 once we write
again N∗(·) instead of x∗0(·). In particular (51) becomes (29). Finally, if we write
N∗(t) as
∫ t
t−T n(s) ds and we take the derivative in (51) we obtain (31).
B Other proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.2. It is enough to note that, for every n0(·) ∈
L2(−T, 0;R+) and every λ0 > 0 we have, by the linearity of the state equation
and of the constraints, Uλ0n0 = λ0Un0 , so that
V (λ0n0(·)) = sup
n(·)∈Uλ0n0
J(λ0n0(·);n(·)) = sup
n(·)∈λ0Un0
J(λ0n0(·);n(·))
= sup
n(·)∈Un0
J(λ0n0(·);λ0n(·))
Now it is easy to check that
J(λ0n0(·);λ0n(·)) = λγ0J(n0(·);n(·))
so the claim is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Thanks to Lemma 2.1 it is enough to prove the
statement for NMAX(t). Let us take t¯ ∈ arg maxs∈[T,2T ]NMAX(s) (the
argmax is non-void because NMAX is continuous on [0,+∞)). We have that
NMAX(t¯) =
a
b
∫ t¯
t¯−T NMAX(s) ds ≤ a/b(2T − t¯) maxs∈[0,T ]NMAX(s) + a/b(t¯ −
T )NMAX(t¯) so NMAX(t¯) ≤ a/b(2T−t¯)1−a/b(t¯−T ) maxs∈[0,T ]NMAX(s). Observe that, for
all t¯ ∈ [T, 2T ] we have that a/b(2T−t¯)1−a/b(t¯−T ) ∈
[
0, abT
]
, so maxs∈[T,2T ]NMAX(s) ≤
a
bT maxs∈[0,T ]NMAX(s). In the same way we can prove that, for all positive integer
n, maxs∈[nT,(n+1)T ]NMAX(s) ≤
(
a
bT
)n
maxs∈[0,T ]NMAX(s). Since, by hypothesis,(
a
bT
)
< 1 we have that limt→+∞NMAX(t) = 0 and then the claim.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. We give the proof in the case γ > 0. The case γ = 0
is simpler.
Part (i): Since the control problem is now one dimensional the value function
v in this case depends only on the variable N . The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation is given by
ρv(N) = sup
n∈[0,aN/b]
(
nv′(N) +
(
a− bnN
)1−σ
1− σ N
γ
)
= 0.
One can directly verify that the function v(N) = αNγ , where α :=
b
γ
(
ρb−aγ
γ
1−σ
σ
)−σ
, is a solution of the above Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
So, using a standard verification argument (see for example Yong and Zhou (1999)
Section 5.3), one proves that such v is indeed the value function of the problem
and that the induced feedback map, given by
n = φ(N) := arg max
n∈[0,aN/b]
(
nv′(N) +
(
a− bnN
)1−σ
1− σ N
γ
)
= θN,
is the (unique) optimal feedback map of the problem. It turns out that the related
trajectory, i.e. the unique solution of N˙∗(t) = φ(N∗(t)) = θN∗(t), N∗(0) = N0,
i.e. N∗(t) = N0eθt is the (unique) optimal trajectory of the problem and so
that the control n∗(t) = θN∗(t) = θN0eθt is the (unique) optimal control. The
expression for c∗(t) follows using (6). Evaluating the utility along the trajectory
N∗(t) one can verify that the condition (20) is indeed necessary and sufficient for
the boundedness of the functional. Part (ii) can be proved using the same kind of
arguments.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Since n∗(·) solves (31) it can be written (see Diek-
mann et al., 1995, page 34) as a series
n∗(t) =
∞∑
j=1
pj(t)e
λjt
where {λj}+∞j=1 are the roots of of the characteristic equation (32) (studied in
Fabbri and Gozzi, 2008, Proposition 2.1.8) and {pj}Nj=1 are C-valued polynomial.
If θT > 1, as already observed in Subsection 2.2 there exists a unique strictly
positive root λ1 = h. Moreover h ∈ (0, θ) and it is also the root with biggest real
part (and it is simple). The polynomial p1 associated to h is a constant (since
h is simple) and can be computed explicitly (see for example Hale and Lunel
(1993) Chapter 1, in particular equations (5.10) that gives the expansion of the
fundamental solution and Theorem 6.1) obtaining that p1 is constant and
p1(t) ≡ θ
1− T (θ − h)
∫ 0
−T
(
1− e(−s−T )h
)
n0(s) ds
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this gives the limit for n(t)∗/eht. The limit for N(t)∗/eht follows from the relation
N∗(t) =
∫ t
t−T n
∗(s) ds.
If θT < 1 each λj , for j ≥ 2, has negative real part while λ1 = 0 is the only
real root. But again if we compute explicitly the polynomial p1 (again a constant
value) related to the root 0 we have
p1(t) ≡
θN0 + (−θ)
∫ 0
−T n0(r) dr
1 + θT
=
θN0 − θN0
1 + θT
= 0.
so only the contributions of the roots with negative real parts remain. This con-
cludes the proof of the claims related to asymptotic behavior of detrended vari-
ables.
Let us prove now that h is an increasing function of T (recall that θ depends
on T too). We use the implicit function theorem. Define
F (λ, T ) = θ(T )(1− e−Tλ)− λ.
Given T such that θ(T )T > 1 one has that F (λ, T ) is concave in λ, F (0, T ) = 0
and F (h, T ) = 0 (recall that h ∈ (0, θ(T ))). So it must be
∂
∂λ
F (λ, T )
∣∣∣∣
λ=h
= θ(T )Te−Th − 1 < 0.
Moreover, since by the definition of θ in (28) we easily get θ′(T ) > 0, we have:
∂F (h, T )
∂T
= θ′(T )(1− e−Th) + θ(T )he−Th > 0
Now, by the implicit function theorem we have
dh
dT
= −∂F
∂T
(
∂F
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=h
)−1
> 0
and this concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The statements follows from Lemma 2.3.3 and Theorem
2.3.4 of Fabbri and Gozzi (2008): here we have the control variable n instead of i
and the state variable N instead of k. The state equation is the same. To rewrite
the objective functional exactly in the form of the problem treated in Fabbri and
Gozzi (2008) we only need to write
aN(t)− bn(t) = b
(a
b
N(t)− n(t)
)
so the functional becomes
b1−σ
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(
a
bN(t)− n(t)
)1−σ
1− σ dt.
The constant b1−σ as it does not changes the optimal trajectories. Dropping it the
functional is the same as the one of Fabbri and Gozzi (2008) where the constant
a is substituted here by ab .
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Proof of Proposition 5.1. Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 the state-
ment is equivalent to that of Proposition 2.3.5 in Fabbri and Gozzi (2008).
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